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THE INSTITUTIONAL WORK OF CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL 
IMPACT BONDS 
 
Abstract 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a new and increasingly popular public policy tool which link 
payments to outcomes thus, in theory, transferring risk from governments to private investors. 
This paper draws on the concepts of institutional work and discursive institutionalism to 
analyse how a SIB influenced the rules, norms and decisions of key actors. It identifies two 
dominant discourses. One focused on addressing the social determinants of health, the other on 
creating the financial structure needed to run a SIB. These discourses were congruent at a 
macro-policy level, but tensions emerged between them at the meso and micro levels. This 
exemplifies the interdependence of structure and agency in institutional work and the mediating 
role which discourse plays. It also suggests that the effectiveness of a SIB depends not just on 
whether it achieves its outcome targets but also on whether it can institute new sets of practices 
and thinking. 
 
Keywords: Social Impact Bonds; Social Prescribing; Outcomes-based commissioning; 
Discursive institutionalism; Impact investment; Social investment 
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Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have emerged as a new policy tool, designed to link the outcomes 
of social interventions to payments with risk, in theory, being borne by private investors rather 
than through public funds. In 2010, the UK’s Ministry of Justice established the first SIB, 
sparking global interest from policy makers, investors, social enterprises and others. Despite 
emerging research on SIBs (Tan et al, 2015; Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017; Fox et al, 2011; 
Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2015), there remains a dearth of granular empirical detail about the 
establishment, operational running and ‘SIB effect’ (i.e. how SIBs effect practices of those 
involved) within wider systemic contexts (Fraser et al, 2018). The majority of studies have 
focused on understanding high-level outcomes of SIBs or on the systems of metrics and 
payments rather than examining the detailed complex set of interactions between key 
personnel.  
 SIBs work by bringing together social investors (e.g. philanthropists, foundations), 
commissioners (i.e. the state) and social purpose organisations (e.g. voluntary sector, social 
enterprises) to facilitate a particular social intervention. Investors provide the working capital 
under the premise that when the outcomes of that intervention are reached (e.g. reduced 
homelessness) then the commissioner will repay the investor at an agreed rate of return. The 
outcomes are independently evaluated using a variety of methodologies with the interventions 
and contracts being managed by a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle’ (SPV) – a particular organisation 
that manages the contract. Thus, SIBs are a complex new policy tool involving a multitude of 
actors yet limited empirical detail is known.  
To gather such detail, Warner (2013) argues the need for an institutionalist approach to 
SIBs that shows evolving rules, norms and practices because these enduring features affect the 
decision-making of key actors. We build upon institutional theory by examining the specific 
discursive nature of a SIB (Schmidt, 2008) to understand the ‘SIB effect’ (Fraser et al, 2018). 
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We primarily draw from the concept of institutional work: understood in terms of agency and 
practices aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al, 2011). 
Drawing from these perspectives, we highlight that this process occurs across macro 
(commissioner level), meso (inter-organisational) and micro (care level) aspects of the SIB 
programme.  
The research focus is a SIB funded programme located in a Northern England city 
which sought to address the social determinants of health (SDH1). We identify and explain 
institutional work through two strands of discourse; the first focusing on the activity for 
significant scaling (i.e. greater and long-term outreach to clients) of a social care practice to 
address the social determinants of health within the National Health Service (NHS); the second 
focuses on the work needed to create and run a SIB. We examine complementarities and 
tensions between these two strands to explore the nature of the ‘SIB effect’.  
Background Literature 
Institutional environments are ‘characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to 
which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy’ 
(Scott 1995: 132). Institutional theory has increasingly focussed on agency and change (Coule 
and Patmore, 2013; Lounsbury, 2007) with the literature recently embracing the concept of 
institutional work. Lawrence and Suddaby (2011: 52) define this as ‘the practices of individual 
and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions’. This offers a 
granular recognition of how individuals work to re-arrange elements of their institutional 
environment. By drawing from this concept within our SIB context, we are interested in the 
                                                          
1 The World Health Organization (2008) defines social determinants of health as factors as ‘access to health 
care, schools and education, conditions of work and leisure, homes, communities, towns or cities – and their 
chances of leading a flourishing life’ (p,1) 
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role of SIBs (and the actors involved) in working to influence create, maintain or disrupt 
institutional frameworks as a means to enact a particular social intervention.    
Discursive institutionalism has adopted a similar view of agency (Schmidt, 2008), 
presenting the view that new ideas are conveyed interactively through discourse; what is said 
by particular actors, to whom, how and why. Key dimensions are cognitive, pertaining to 
recipes and guidelines for action as well as normative, reflecting shared expectations and values 
to actions. Actors use their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ (e.g. communication of new ideas) 
to change or maintain these elements of institutions (Schmidt, 2010). It is the purposive action 
of institutional work, playing out through discourse, which frames this study. This can be 
formal (i.e. setting up new structures, processes) or informal in intent (i.e. changing cultures, 
expectations) with the work itself being normative or cognitive.  SIBs are relevant to this 
framing because they propose a new set of approaches to fund and support particular types of 
public services. At a policy level, Fraser et al. (2018) emphasise the public sector reform 
narrative as a central element of SIBs, suggesting that their focus on outcomes lead to new 
forms of change across different aspects of the system (e.g. healthcare) such as improving 
innovation in service provision. Dowling and Harvie (2014) present this narrative as an 
emerging movement towards the financialisation of social value in public service delivery and 
is echoed by McHugh et al, (2013) who suggest this represents a neo-liberal shift in public 
service delivery.  
Similarly, prior research also highlights how, through SIBs, a potential close number 
of ideals, values and tools from private sector management have been imported (Tan et al, 
2015). By using techniques more akin to a business and market based approaches of revenue 
maximization to address social problems, such organisations espouse a mixture of values from 
the for-profit and not-for-profit world (Nicholls, 2010). However, such a private sector 
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management approach may induce negative effects associated with performance management 
(Lowe and Wilson, 2017). Edmiston and Nicholls (2017) highlight the data collection 
requirements of SIBs and the ‘administrative burden’ for service providers coupled with 
extensive micro-management to enable attainment of successful outcomes (Fox and Albertson, 
2011). Here, the SIB mechanism is influential in shaping norms around expectations associated 
with individual roles through a renewed focus on ‘business-like’ approaches.  
On one hand, the literature has focused on SIBs from the point of view of policy 
development and has been largely critical. On the other hand, it has discussed SIBs as a 
potential change agent through a rise of an ‘entrepreneurial approach’ to social change 
(Dowling, 2017). This view of agency is also reflected in the idea that SIBs help to improve 
collaboration and innovation (Arena et al, 2016; Nicholls and Tomkinson, 2015), although 
scepticism exists concerning the scope of this claim (Giacomantonio, 2017; Sinclair et al., 
2014). The agency view is similarly echoed by Maier et al, (2017) who argue that such multi-
stakeholder collaboration can engender culture change and thus may be one enduring feature. 
As Bengo and Calderini (2016) suggest, SIBs may only be more feasible where cultural and 
ideological barriers are lower, for example, where delivery organizations are seen as more 
entrepreneurial and with the requisite managerial skills.  
In this paper we ask: What kind of institutional work is required for the development 
and operation of a SIB? What are the consequences of this type of work? This leads us to 
consider the roles that people adopt, their work habits, social norms, what is perceived to 
represent an appropriate course of action, and how that is represented through the emerging 
discourse of change. The aforementioned SIB literature is largely conceptual in nature but does 
pinpoint SIBs as a potential change agent. However, the lack of empirical detail weakens our 
understanding of this ‘SIB effect’ (Fraser et al, 2018). Our framing of institutional work and 
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the underpinning discourse allows us to speculate about the wider systemic implications of 
SIBs and to consider that actors play a key role in efforts to drive institutional change. 
Methods  
The research focuses on SDH, an intervention which seeks to address the social determinants 
of health by enabling people to build new relationships and practices via a programme of social 
prescribing2.  One of the key aspects of the SDH programme is the creation, within the service 
delivery, of a paid care role who builds a relationship with the client and enables them to 
connect with a range of relevant local services. We will call this role the ‘Care Connector’. 
SDH began development as a SIB programme through a coalition instigated by a local 
voluntary sector support agency in 2011. The commissioner for the SIB programme is the local 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). The investor is one of the main actors in the social 
investment field, and the programme has received development resources, and on-going grant 
support from central government and charitable funders. 
SDH began operations in April 2015. Over the course of the seven year CCG contract, 
it plans to engage over 11,000 beneficiaries. The impact is attributed and payments are 
generated and paid on the achievement of agreed outcome metric targets, including recruitment 
to the SDH service and calculations based on reductions in secondary care costs. The latter is 
evaluated by observing hospital referrals in one part of the city as a ‘control group’ (i.e. a group 
of individuals who have not received this particular intervention) against those who have 
received the SDH intervention (NAO 2015). The main payments are based on the use of a 
measurement tool which records and scores improvements in a beneficiaries’ well-being as 
agreed with a Care Connector (MacKeith, 2011). SDH has been very successful in its first year 
                                                          
2 As defined by Dayson (2017: 399): Social prescribing is a catch-all term for non-medical services and referral 
pathways developed with the aim of preventing worsening health for people with long-term health conditions 
and reducing the number and intensity of costly interventions in urgent or specialist care.  
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of operation. It hit ambitious referral targets, and over-achieved in terms of improvements to 
the well-being scores.  
This paper adopts a single case study research design, drawing primarily from 
interviews with key actors. In the first round in August 2015, we conducted 13 interviews with 
the purpose of looking back at the setting-up of the SIB and looking forward at the anticipated 
effects of it. Exploring the history of the SIB provided an opportunity to learn about the long-
run institutional story of the healthcare context, service provision and funding environment. In 
the second round in summer 2016, we conducted a further 9 interviews with the key participants 
of the first year of the SIB’s operations. This was augmented with secondary material – the 
early proposals and independent evaluations from those funding the development work. 
A single case study design is useful in circumstances that relate to new phenomena 
being studied (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). As in most single case study designs, we adopt 
a multi-level approach to understand the key actors and relationships within the SIB. This 
follows the macro, meso and micro conception of nested policy paradigms outlined by Nicholls 
and Teasdale (2017) emphasising the multi-level nature of policy. This multi-level account of 
the data emerged as we observed a diverse range of conversations across key actors. As we 
applied an initial set of themes to the data (Saldana, 2015), it was clear that institutional work 
was being conducted at a macro-level – pertaining to conversations between key institutional 
actors in Government, the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) and the NHS. This desire for 
change manifested itself throughout the SIB structure with meso-level institutional work 
occurring through the multiple interactions of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV: a new 
organisation established to manage the contract) and at the micro-level through the challenges 
faced by service providers. Our analysis is abductive in nature (Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012), in that it was initially inductive but moved back and forth between the data and theory 
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(deductive) to finalise the analytical structure presented in Figure 2. We highlight the three 
sites of work and sources of data in the context of the web of interactions and relationships in 
Figure 1. We anonymise participants but draw from this data across the two rounds of data 
collection to structure the findings (e.g. P#1, R2).  
__________________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
__________________ 
 
Findings 
We disaggregate our findings in SIBs as multi-level – placing emphasis on formal and informal 
institutional work by key actors across macro, meso and micro levels. Our findings are 
consistently structured in terms of two strands where discourse (i.e. where ideas are conveyed, 
adopted or adapted) is represented through (a) expanding work which addresses the social 
determinants of health and (b) implementing the SIB structure. This is demonstrated in Figure 
2 which highlights the codes ascribed to institutional work across the three levels of analysis 
and within the two strands of institutional work and associated discourse3. The green arrows 
represent congruence in these two streams whilst the red shows a tension.  
__________________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
__________________ 
Formal Institutional Work 
Macro: Influencing commissioner practice 
There are two elements to the macro-level institutional work used by the actors who established 
the SIB. The first (a) element was the desire, on behalf of one of the key actors, to expand the 
role of care programmes which address the ‘social determinants of health’ (P#2. R1) within the 
                                                          
3 Excerpts of relevant data can be accessed at: https://institutionalworksibs.wordpress.com/  
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healthcare system in the city and was based on a detailed long-term analysis. For approximately 
20 years, this actor had used numerous small funding pots to establish health programmes 
which piloted various aspects of the programme, but had been unable to persuade various health 
commissioners to commission these programmes using ‘mainstream’ resources. The previous 
lack of success was attributed to not having evidence that SDH interventions achieved 
sufficient benefits and cost savings within the ‘medical model’ of healthcare, which was the 
dominant conceptual framework used by commissioners (P#2, R1).  
From this perspective, the desired change of the formal institutional work was that the 
CCG should commission programmes which tackled the social determinants of health as part 
of their mainstream provision: ‘no more pilots’ (P#2, R1) as one of the key instigators of the 
programme described. This can be identified as formal institutional work, involving the 
creation of a new commissioned programme, including the creation of new formal structures 
such as the SPV, yet the discourse is normative based on a view of what commissioners should 
be doing. Whilst the case for a new formal programme was part of a broader challenge that key 
actors sought to change the culture of commissioning (the informal work). Through our 
discourse lens, this represents a challenge to the underpinning ‘philosophy’ (Schmidt, 2008) of 
macro-scale commissioning work.  
 This work was partially achieved when SDH was commissioned by the CCG, using 
the SIB mechanism. Key actors believed the SIB vehicle was a crucial mechanism which 
enabled this achievement. Whilst the Payment by Results element of the contract between the 
CCG and SDH enabled the CCG to be assured that it would only pay for the SDH programme 
if it were a proven success within their existing ‘medical model’. This allowed the CCG to 
manage the risk of commissioning an ‘unproven’ intervention (P#2, R1, P#3, R1). Furthermore, 
the nature of the data collected by the SDH programme would enable the case for this type of 
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intervention to be proven (or not), and this could inform future commissioning decisions. The 
SIB therefore provided a helpful way to work around to the problems that SDH instigators had 
experienced with the commissioning of such activity. 
The second element of macro-level formal institutional work concerns the development 
and acceptance of SIBs as a mechanism to fund healthcare interventions (b). This was a key 
driver of change for other actors involved in the development of SDH (P#8, P#4, P#7, R1). 
These actors were concerned that the funding landscape for voluntary sector organisations was 
changing, as a result of significant, and long-term cuts to public expenditure, and that this 
threatened the future of voluntary sector health and social care activity in the city. 
The formal institutional work of these actors was therefore to change the procurement 
processes of the CCG to enable a SIB to be commissioned in this field of practice, which would 
then enable SIBs to be commissioned in other areas of practice. They were successful in 
achieving this aim, in that the CCG commissioned SDH as a SIB, and during the development 
phase of the SIB, the CCG’s rules governing their own behaviour in commissioning NHS 
contracts were successfully challenged (P#3, R1). Furthermore, other public bodies in the city 
have begun discussions concerning potential SIB programmes. 
We can see therefore that at the macro-level, there was significant convergence between 
the two elements of formal institutional work or what Schmidt (2008) suggests is a kind of 
‘coordinative discourse’ between key individuals to initiate change. The interests of those 
seeking to develop SDH, and those seeking to develop a SIB aligned. The SIB funding 
mechanism, based on upfront resources provided by others, combined with a Payment by 
Results contract, enabled the CCG to commission a service which addressed the social 
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determinants of health and the development process for SDH successfully challenged the rules 
regarding the role that the CCG could play in commissioning future SIB activity. 
However, the alignment of these two pieces of institutional work collapsed over time. 
Those who instigated SDH as a means to expand SDH-type provision in the city were 
successful in ways they did not anticipate. SDH was commissioned to work in one part of the 
city only. The Local Authority and CCG put resources into other social determinants of health 
programmes in other parts of the city, as well as in neighbouring cities (P#2, P#15, R2). Whilst 
demonstrating successful institutional work in one sense, the recognition and expansion of the 
model, undermined the SIB experiment through the planned ‘control group’ also having 
interventions which SDH was planning to use to demonstrate its effectiveness (see section 
below). 
Meso: Formalising roles and reporting the ‘right’ evidence  
The formal, meso-level institutional work to expand SDH-type provision contained a number 
of elements (a). It involved taking the Care Connector practice which had been developed and 
established within one organisation over the previous 20 years and formalising it so that it could 
be undertaken by a range of organisations (P#2, P#8, P#7, R1). This emerged in terms of the 
development of work specifications that formed the basis of a procurement exercise in which 
voluntary sector organisations submitted applications to deliver the SDH service, and then 
through into Care Connector job specifications. 
The SDH work here concerns the discourse of care for such roles and formalising this 
so that it can be enacted well by a range of organisations. This formal, meso-level institutional 
work was successfully undertaken by the emerging SDH Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). This 
was deemed to be important because it expanded the Care Connector model beyond the initial 
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organisation which had developed it, and into a range of voluntary and private sector health 
and social care delivery organisations. The procurement exercise also helped to legitimise the 
emerging SDH programme in the eyes of the broader voluntary-sector in the city by giving a 
range of organisations the opportunity to bid to deliver the work (P#7, R1). 
The formal, meso-level institutional work required by the SIB element focused mainly 
on developing appropriate performance management mechanisms (b). These were required to 
enable the SPV and the investors to collect and analyse performance data, and thereby receive 
payment from investors and analyse the performance of the different delivery organisations. 
The practices are represented here through efforts to get actors to make sense of how to do this 
type of contract (the CCG) and the performance management associated with producing the 
data for this (service delivery organisations). The complexity associated with this within a SIB 
model reveals how the SPV looks to comply with the rules and procedures of the SIB. They 
ensure that contractual obligations are being met and that the ‘right’ evidence is being used for 
this (P#10, R2).  
Initially, this work seemed to be partially successful. At first, providers reported that 
they were generally happy with the metrics and indicators that were being used to measure 
their performance (P#12, R1), and they were similar to metrics that they would have chosen 
themselves. However, there were also significant tensions between the institutional work 
required to create the SIB, and that required to expand a programme which tackled the social 
determinants of health. We can see this at the meso-level through tension between the 
requirements of the SIB to focus the programme only on those for whom reliable ‘impact’ data 
could be collected and the judgement of GPs as to who would benefit from this programme’s 
approach. As part of the development phase, consultation was undertaken with GPs to help 
determine who the programme should target. GPs identified a range of people that they thought 
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would benefit from the programme. This identified need covered a wide range of conditions 
and incorporated both those currently living with those conditions, and those at risk of 
developing them in future. 
As an example, GPs identified patients with musculoskeletal conditions as one of the 
key target populations who would significantly benefit from the programme, and as a set of 
people who were costing the NHS most in terms of supporting them to manage those conditions 
(P#2 R1). However, the target-setting requirements of the SIB meant that who the programme 
could select for SDH interventions was the focus of ongoing negotiation. It subsequently 
became clear that the SIB funding meant that SDH programme intervention could only work 
with those conditions which represented a distinct category in the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) disease register. This would make an adequate return on investment based 
on the existing secondary care price list (NHS Tariff), as this information was required in order 
to generate an effective ’control group’, and so be able calculate the financial impact that the 
SIB funded programme had made. Given that there was no existing category for 
musculoskeletal conditions, SDH was unable to target this group.  
This requirement of the SIB performance management mechanism had three negative 
effects on the institutional work required to expand programmes to tackle the social 
determinants of health. Firstly, it prevented the programme being able to support groups which 
could have best helped demonstrate the case for this approach to commissioners. Secondly, it 
meant that the original prevention/early intervention focus of the SDH programme became 
diluted as the requirements of the payment mechanisms meant that the focus had to be on 
patient groups where evidence for the effects of the intervention was available to meet the proof 
of cost savings requirements. Thirdly, it made it more difficult for the programme to develop 
effective relationships with GPs (and thus to secure referrals) because GPs felt that the SDH 
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was not focussed on those they had identified as being in the most need (P#12, R1). These 
elaborate Dowling’s (2017) critique concerning the reality of whether cost savings can actually 
be achieved through SIBs and reinforces the critique by McHugh et al, (2013) which highlights 
the over simplification of outcomes that SIBs seem to produce. 
Furthermore, there was a significant tension between the macro-level institutional work 
of expanding the social determinants of health programme and the meso-level creation of the 
performance management mechanism by which the SPV could have its performance (and 
financial returns) calculated. This tension was so severe that the successful expansion of the 
social determinants work in the city undermined the mechanism by which SDH was supposed 
to be paid, as we shall now explore. 
For SIBs to operate in the manner in which they were designed, a SIB-funded 
programme should be able to identify the attributable difference which that particular set of 
interventions has made (NAO 2015). For SDH, this meant that it planned to develop a control-
group of similar people with long term conditions in another part of the city. The idea was that 
by analysing the difference in the use of unplanned secondary care between those that received 
SDH support, and those in the other part of the city who had not, SDH would be able to identify 
the difference it had made. This measurement was to be the basis on which 70% of payments 
to SDH were to be made (P#3, R1). The Local Authority and CCG resourced the creation of 
other programmes to address the social determinants of health in the area of the city where the 
control cohort was supposed to be taking place, thus undermining the establishment of a 
meaningful control group (P#2, R2). 
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Micro: Role and data production requirements 
The formal, micro-level work required to institutionalise the expansion of  SDH-type activity 
manifest in two ways (a) how the provider organisations interpreted and enacted the Care 
Connector role, and (b) how they developed and enacted their own data recording mechanisms, 
above and beyond that required by the SIB. 
This first set of institutional work was not without its challenges (a). Whilst the different 
providers shared formal documentation of the Care Connector role, how they conveyed the 
discourse of care through this role was very different. One of the providers interpreted the role 
primarily as a signposting function. They encouraged their Care Connectors to form light-touch 
relationships, primarily based on signposting clients to appropriate activities, for fear of 
creating a dependency on that relationship (P#14, R1). Other providers interpreted the role of 
Care Connector as requiring a much greater depth of relationship between client and Care 
Connector (P#12, R1, R2). This difference resulted in significant differences in the caseloads 
which Care Connectors could accommodate, and on-going disagreement between providers 
about the nature of the work (P#10, R2). 
The providers also had a second set of formal, micro-level work to undertake: to 
develop the data collection practice which would enable them to reflect on the effectiveness of 
their own care practice. We know that this is different from the data required for SIB reporting 
purposes, because one of the providers chose to record data against additional metrics, as they 
felt that the SIB data was not sufficient to enable them to reflect on their practice (P#12, R2). 
Providers also reported that, if they were free to choose how to use the recording tools given 
to them, they would use them differently. For example, they would use a well-being metric to 
record client progress at time intervals chosen by the worker, based on their understanding of 
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client need, rather than at the rigid time-intervals demanded by the SDH performance 
indicators. 
The formal, micro-level work to institutionalise the SIB (b) is manifest through the 
evidence that service delivery organisations are required to generate to meet their contractual 
obligations. This evidence feeds into the SIB system of metrics and payments at the meso level 
and providing macro level support to the viability of the idea of the SDH model. Whilst the 
meso level is concerned with how the SPV manages the complexities between investors, the 
CCG and the providers, this level is concerned with how these contractual requirements link to 
what the providers do at the micro level i.e. their practices within their respective organisations. 
The key challenge for such provider organisations seemed to relate to whether they can align 
the work they do with the data the contracts oblige them to collect.  
 As identified by Joy and Shields (2013), the experience of providers suggests that the 
process of generating evidence to meet the performance indicators set by SDH distorted 
practice, was resource intensive, stressful (P#12, R2) and encouraged ‘creaming’ of clients – 
working with those who are easiest to help (P#2, R2). There were also indications of ‘teaching 
to the test’ activity which enables targets to be met, but which does not address the wider 
problem which the programme seeks to address (P#12, R2). This gaming is also consistent with 
findings from the outcomes-based performance literature (Lowe and Wilson, 2015).  
In addition, the providers had a number of reservations about how the data from their 
reporting was being interpreted for contract management. In particular, they had serious 
concerns about whether the data they were generating for the information system was an 
accurate reflection of the work they were doing (P#13, R2). This led to concerns that the 
19 
 
onerous data driven nature of the exercise reduced the time Care Connectors had to develop 
relationships with clients (P#13, R2).  
Providers didn’t necessarily feel that collecting data was unhelpful but they came to the 
view that the data required by the SDH programme was unhelpful and inaccurate. Some 
providers actually collected additional data to facilitate a performance management 
conversation with the SPV manager (P#11, R2) and with GPs. The type of data they were 
collecting was also not seen as useful in a learning sense and couldn’t be used to inform practice 
but just enforce the contract (P#13, R2).  This creates an interesting contrast with the original 
rhetoric of those who developed the SIB, who expected it to offer ‘robust’ services through 
more-effective data analysis (P#1, 2, 4 & P#8, R1). 
We can see, therefore, tension between the practices enacted by the providers in order 
to formally institutionalise the SIB at a micro-level, and those required to formally 
institutionalise SDH-type activity at a micro level. The pressure of referral targets led, in some 
cases, to people being enrolled in the programme because they were easy to help, rather than 
those in need (P#2, R2). In other cases, it led to people being enrolled in the programme simply 
because they could be reached via an initial phone call, irrespective of whether they were 
interested in further participation (P#12 R2). Furthermore, there was tension between the data 
production which was required to institutionalise SDH, and that required by the SIB.  
Informal Institutional Work 
Macro: Introducing new cognitive frameworks 
The informal, macro-level work required to expand SDH-type activity concerned a change in 
attitudes and norms amongst commissioners about the value of work which addressed the social 
determinants of health (a). Thus, it sought to change the discourse around the most relevant 
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health interventions. In this context, the instigators of SDH were seeking to create a social 
model of health provision rather than a purely medical one – the logic being that one needs to 
address the underlying social causes of health in addition to current services (P#2, R1)  
Part of this work required changing the perceptions of commissioners about their role in 
developing people’s broad sense of wellbeing. Some commissioners reported that they were 
uneasy about funding the SDH programme because as health commissioners it was not their 
job to fund patient ‘happiness’ (P#3, R1). In an attempt to change this attitude, those developing 
SDH commissioned a review of research which sought to identify a causal connection between 
activities which promoted a broad sense of patient wellbeing and ‘hard’ medical outcomes 
(P#2, P#7, R1). 
The informal, macro-level work to create a SIB was seeking a different cultural change 
(b). The institutional work in this respect centred on the discourse of making the voluntary 
sector more ‘business-like’ (P#7, R1). More specifically, to understand outcome-based 
contracting mechanisms and the associated risks as small to medium sized organizations (P#2, 
R1). Similar to the formal version, the informal macro-level institutional work of expanding 
SDH and creating culture-change in the voluntary sector seem to complement one another. 
Embracing the SIB model of funding was an opportunity to enact at scale a revised model of 
healthcare which enables social determinants to be understood. This particular SIB acted as a 
‘prime’ for future similar interventions (P#5, R1) that other elements of the system may be able 
learn from (P#1, R1).The thinking behind the shared risk nature of the SIB model is that it 
would allow the voluntary sector to experience and experiment with this type of contract 
without taking on too much financial risk (P#8, R1). Furthermore, the experimental and 
innovative nature of the SIB funding mechanism appears to have helped overcome 
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commissioner scepticism about the likely success of SDH in reducing secondary care costs 
(P#3, R1). 
At this point, we can also note the tension between the SDH-supporting and SIB-
supporting institutional work at the macro-level, in terms of the relationship between the formal 
and informal institutional work as highlighted in Figure 2. The formal, structural changes 
required by the SIB supporting work - creating a new payments by results commissioning 
model which used changes in unplanned hospital admissions as the key payment trigger - 
reinforced a ‘medical model’ view of people; it encourages commissioners to view people as 
units who have particular medical problems which result in hospitalisation. This is at odds with 
a cultural shift towards an SDH view of people (P#1, R1) 
Meso: Complexity and simplicity, sharing and learning  
The meso-level of informal institutional work to enact the expansion of SDH-type activity is 
manifest in terms of creating a culture of sharing and learning within the programme’s 
operation (a). For the commissioners, SDH was a way for them to demonstrate that they were 
taking the integration of health and social care services seriously (P#3, R1). This informal 
institutional work can also be seen in the attempts by the SPV to develop a ‘sharing’ and 
‘learning’ culture between the different provider organisations, so that practice improves across 
the four organisations (P#10, R2; P#13, R2).  
The meso-level of informal institutional work to create a SIB relates to the 
operationalization of the ‘business-like’ culture being cultivated with service providers and fed 
from the performance requirements of the CCG and the social investor (b). It is here that we 
observe how the relevant actors think, handle and manage the risk and uncertainty associated 
with the SIB through performance management. We identify one consistent thread throughout 
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the multi-layered pressures: the assertion from each actor that, from their perspective, the world 
is complex and nuanced, but that they need the world of other actors to be simple, and expressed 
solely in terms of key performance metrics.   
At the meso-level, the SPV feels the pressure of having to engage with the complexity 
upwards to the CCG and investors, and downwards to the service providers. However, the 
direct and indirect effects of the SIB seem to make responding to this complexity more 
challenging (P#10, R2). This is due to the ways in which the performance management aspects 
of the SDH programme, both those drawn directly from the SIB funding arrangements, and 
those performance indicators which seek to embed the ‘business-like’ culture which those 
creating the SIB demand, seek to replace complexity with the simplicity of achieving targets 
(or not). 
Within each aspect of the performance management culture and discourse, there are 
instances where those being performance managed assert the complexity of the situation in 
which they are trying to work, and those who are performance managing demand the simplicity 
of conversations based on whether people/organisations are producing the required numbers. 
We see it in the relationship between the SPV and the commissioner, in which the SPV 
emphasises the complexity of the work (P#2, R2), whilst the commissioner emphasises the 
simplicity of the agreed targets (P#3, R2). We see this same dynamic played out in the 
conversations between the SPV and the providers, but this time, because of they are playing 
different roles in the performance management conversation, this time it is the providers talking 
about complexity (P#12 R2) and then the SPV insisting on the simplicity of the agreed metrics 
(P#3, R2). 
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At the meso-level of informal institutional change, we again see the tension between 
the two different strands of institutional work being undertaken. In particular, the manager of 
the SPV described the way in which their performance management role was in conflict with 
efforts to promote sharing and learning between providers. This manifest in provider resistance 
to having their organisational culture changed to become more ‘business-like’ (P#10, R2). 
Again, it is also important to note the tension between the SDH-supporting and SIB-supporting 
institutional work (this time at the meso-level), in terms of the relationship between the formal 
and informal institutional work. The formal performance management structures created to 
make the SIB work impacted negatively on the culture of sharing required to make an SDH 
care programme effective across organisations. 
Micro: Culture of care and data reporting  
At the micro-level, the informal institutional work required to expand SDH-type activity 
consisted of two elements: (a) developing teams of Care Connectors with an appropriate culture 
of care. Managers of delivery teams described this attitude as people who had strong local 
knowledge, sought empowerment for others, without taking decisions for them, and those who 
‘wouldn’t take no for an answer’ (P#13, P#12, R1). The second element (b) consisted of 
building relationships between the delivery organisations and GPs, who were acting as referral 
agents for the programme. This process was helped considerably by the long-history of similar 
activity undertaken by some of the instigators of the SDH programme (P#4, R1). 
The informal, micro-level institutional work required to create a SIB manifest in the 
way that delivery organisations had to develop the ‘business-like’ data recording culture which 
enabled the SIB to function. This was partly successful, as all the delivery organisations 
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adopted the required data-recording practices, and one went considerably further, recording a 
range of data that was not required by the SIB monitoring processes (P#12, R1). 
However, there was again tension between the two competing institutional aims: 
expanding SDH-activity and establishing a SIB. These emerged in terms of the different 
cultures around data recording and sharing: the SDH-type work required recording data for 
learning and practice improvement, the SIB required data for contract management purposes 
with these competing demands leading to problems (P#2, R2). Once more, this can also been 
not just as tension between the SDH-supporting and SIB-supporting informal institutional 
work, but also as tension between the SIB-supporting formal work and the SDH-supporting 
informal work. The culture of data-recording is bound up with the structures for data-recording 
required by the SIB. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Despite the growing interest in SIBS (Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2015), there is currently a lack 
of granular empirical data that enables understanding of the ‘SIB effect’ (Fraser et al, 2018). 
To do this we have drawn upon the ideas behind institutional work (Lawrence et al, 2011) 
and discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008) to position the creation and implementation 
of SIBs as a mechanism that leads to institutional change at macro, meso and micro levels. In 
our healthcare context, SIBs were only the latest component of a lengthy and complex history 
of institutional change within localised healthcare settings.   
 In drawing from the concepts of the informal and formal nature of institutional work, 
this paper demonstrates the efforts of actors to bring about institutional development through 
the SIB as well as the unintended consequences associated with this. We identify this through 
discourse in both: (a) expanding work which addresses the social determinants of health and 
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(b) implementing the SIB structure. Whilst this seemed a relatively harmonious concept at a 
macro-level, we observed the emergence of tensions when this manifest itself at the meso and 
micro level. Demonstrating the effect that the SIB seems to have on delivery organisations who 
are typically embedded in a set of practices and cultures that can be at odds with how the SIB 
worked (Joy and Shields, 2013) which produced an over simplification of outcome focus and 
reporting (McHugh et al, 2013). This is also congruent with the ‘gaming’ of outcome data that 
we found in the SDH programme, which has also been seen in other SIB programmes 
(Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017). The congruence at macro-level, however, indicates that 
alignment may be easier to achieve at a policy rather than delivery-level (Maier et al, 2016). In 
this respect, the requirements of the work to implement a SIB with a finance focus is not always 
congruent with its setting; a similar set of dynamics is highlighted by Dayson (2017), and 
Carmel and Harlock (2008) in the voluntary sector.  
 We offer this as our first theoretical contribution. One way to understand ‘the SIB 
effect’ is examine the potential congruencies and conflicts between the institutional work 
required to create the social intervention, and the institutional work required to create the SIB-
mechanism itself (Fraser et. al, 2018). This finding highlights the importance of using a framing 
of formal and informal institutional work which is, in addition, supported by an understanding 
of the discourse (Schmidt, 2008) which is more effective at recognising the interdependence of 
structure and agency. This represents an important contribution to the SIB literature which has 
provided a largely conceptual account of agency (Dowling, 2017; McHugh et al, 2013; Nicholls 
and Teasdale, 2017). Changes to the formal structures (such as creating newly commissioned 
programmes) are interdependent with changes to the commissioners’ discourse about what it 
is desirable to commission (a shift from medical to social determinant of health models). 
Similarly, the formal structure of the performance management rules of the SPV was (both) 
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created in response to the norms required to implement the culture of ‘being business-like’ and 
in turn influenced the type of performance management culture of the SDH programme.  
 It is therefore important to highlight the conflicts between the sets of formal and 
informal institutional work represented in Figure 2. There is a consistent conflicted relationship 
between the formal structures required to instantiate the SIB and the informal culture of the 
SDH programme. These conflicts exemplify the interdependence of structure and agency in 
institutional work and the mediating role of discourse in this process.  The structures were made 
by (often heated and protracted) discourse between different actors who were trying to achieve 
different institutional ends (SDH-creating and SIB-creating). Thus, the structures themselves 
ended up shaping both the form and the content of the conversations between the different 
actors in the programme. We offer this reinforcement of the mediating role of discourse, 
building on Lawrence et al, (2011), as our second theoretical contribution. 
 Our findings also indicate areas for policy development. They suggest those instituting 
SIBs should reflect on the institutional work required to both promote the convergence required 
in order to instigate a programme and to subsequently stabilise the programme. Considering 
particular structures or actions in this way will help those making decisions to have better 
insights about the work needed to develop and institutionalise the components of a SIB funded 
social intervention and their complex inter-relationships. Our perspective also suggests that the 
potential for SIBs is unlikely to depend on just the outcome of the project itself (i.e. whether 
outcome targets were met) or even the wider policy context but also on whether a programme 
institutes a new set of practices and thinking across macro, meso and micro levels. 
 In interpreting the findings of this study, it is important to be mindful of the limitations 
of such an institutionalist approach. Suddaby et al, (2017) offer a criticism of some of the core 
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components in institutional theory which are seen as increasingly rationalised. Indeed, research 
in another SIB context may see some of the key actors as less susceptible to some of the 
pressures we identify. Nonetheless, by looking at the granular detail of institutional work, the 
convergent and divergent consequences, we are able to empirically bring the agency and 
discourse of the relevant actors into the explanation of SIB policy and practice.  
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Figure 1: Model of Interactions and Key Stakeholders. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Institutional work of SIBs across macro, meso and micro levels  
 
